Abstract: Most cryptocurrency systems or systems based on blockchain technology are currently using the elliptic curves digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) on the secp256k1 curve, which is susceptible to backdoors implemented by the curve creator (secp256k1). The paper proposes a multiple elliptic curves digital signature algorithm (MECDSA), which allows not only for setting the number of elliptic curves according to practical security requirements, but also for editing the parameters of each elliptic curve. The performance analysis proves that the scheme is secure and efficient, and can avoid any backdoors implemented by curve creators. We suggest that the systems based on blockchain should operate in two elliptic curves considering the contradiction between security and efficiency.
Introduction
Digital signatures [1] [2] are used to detect unauthorized modifications to data and to authenticate the identity of the signer. The recipient of signed message can use a digital signature as evidence to demonstrate to a third party that the signature was generated by the claimed signer. Digital signatures uses a combination of hash functions and public key cryptography. Firstly, the message digest is created using a hash function. The signature is created by encrypting the message digest using the signer's private key. Anyone can use the signer's public key and the same hash function to verify the received signature.
Until now, most cryptocurrency systems [3] [4] [5] or systems based on blockchain technology [6] [7] have used in elliptic curves digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) [8] [9] [10] , which is based on secp256k1 11 . Secp256k1 was almost never used before Bitcoin became popular, but it is now gaining in popularity due to several beneficial properties. Most commonly-used curves have random structure, but secp256k1 was constructed in a unique, non-random way which allows for especially efficient computation. As a result, it is often more than 30% faster than other curves if the implementation is sufficiently optimized. However, it cannot prevent the curve's creator from inserting any backdoors into the curve. So we propose a multiple elliptic curves digital signature algorithm (MECDSA), which is more secure and can avoid any backdoors. In MECDSA scheme, the user cannot only choose the number of elliptic curves according to practical security requirements, but also can customize the curve by editing its parameters.
The multiple elliptic curves digital signature algorithm serves four purposes. Firstly, the signature proves that the owner of the private key, who is by implication the owner of the funds, has authorized the spending of the funds. Secondly, the proof of authorization is undeniable. Thirdly, the signature proves that the transaction has not and cannot be modified by anyone after it has been signed. Fourthly, the signature scheme can avoid any backdoors in the ECDSA curve.
In section 2, we summarize existing elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA). In section 3, we propose a multiple elliptic curves digital signature algorithm (MECDSA). In section 4, we analyze the performance of MECDSA from its validity, security and efficiency.
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
An elliptic curve E over a finite prime field Fp is defined by the short Weierstrass equation, E: 2 = 3 + + where , ∈ , 4 3 + 27 2 ≠ 0( ), and is a large prime. is a randomly selected elements on the elliptic curve E, called the base point, whose order is a large prime that makes = , where is the zero element of the field ( ), > 2 160 , > 4√ .
A signer chooses a random number ∈ [1, ] as a private key, and computes public key Q = .
ECDSA Signature Generation
A signer signs the message according to the following steps:
Step 1: Compute = ( ), where is the secure hash algorithm.
Step 2: Select a random integer from [1, − 1], and compute = ( , ).
Step 3: Compute = ( ). If = 0, go back to step 2 and reselect .
Step 4: Compute = −1 ( + )( ). If = 0, go back to step 2 and reselect . Then the signature on the message m is the pair ( , ).
ECDSA Signature Verification
Anyone can check to see if the signature ( , ) of the message is valid by completing the following steps:
Step 1: Verify that and are integers in [1, − 1]. If not, the signature is invalid.
Step 2: Compute = ( ), where is a same hash function used in signature generation.
Step 3: Compute = −1 ( ).
Step 4: Compute = ( ), = ( ).
Step 5: Compute = + = ( , ). The signature is valid if = ( ), or otherwise it is invalid. The signer can obviously operate the ECDSA times (t-ECDSA), and get the signature ( 1 , 1 , 2 , 2 , … , , , ) in elliptic curves, but this will make the length of the signature long. To fix this, we present a secure multiple elliptic curves digital signature algorithm (MECDSA) in the next section, which can reduce the length of signature.
Multiple Elliptic Curves Digital Signature Algorithm
In this section, we propose a secure multiple elliptic curves digital signature algorithm (MECDSA), which can avoid any backdoors in the curve used by secp256k1. In this signature scheme, the user can not only choose the number of elliptic curves according to practical security requirements, but also can choose the curve by changing its parameters.
The parameters of MECDSA are same as ECDSA. There are elliptic curves : 2 = 3 + + over finite prime field F , is the base point whose order is , where = 1,2, … , . In MECDSA, the signer chooses the number of curve and the parameters of the curves. After this, the signer chooses t random numbers ∈ [1, ] as a private key, and computes the public key = , where = 1,2, … , .
MECDSA Signature Generation
A signer signs the message m according to the following steps ( fig. 1 ):
Step 2: Select random integer ∈ [1, − 1], computer = ( 1 , 1 ), where = 1,2, … , .
Step 3: Compute = ( ). If = 0, go back to step 2 and reselect , where = 1,2, … , .
Step 4: Compute = 1 + 2 + ⋯ + . If = 0(mod ), return step 2, where = 1,2, … , .
Step 5: Compute = −1 [ + ]( ). If = 0, go back to step 2 and reselect , where = 1,2, … , .
Then ( , 1 , 2 , … , ) is taken as the signature of the message .
MECDSA Signature Verification
Anyone can check whether or not the signature ( , 1 , 2 , … , ) of is valid by completing the following steps:
Step 1: Verify that and are integers in [t, 1 + 2 + ⋯ + − ] and [1, − 1] respectively, where = 1, 2, … , . If not, refuse the signature
Step 
Performance Analysis
In the section, we analyze the performance of MECDSA from different perspectives, including validity, security and efficiency.
Validity Analysis
According MECDSA signature generation and signature verification algorithm in MECDSA, we can get:
So ′ = = and r = ′ 1 + ′ 2 + ⋯ ′ = 1 + 2 + ⋯ , where = 1,2, … , . Therefore, we prove the correctness of MECDSA.
Security Analysis
The security of cryptosystems using elliptic curves hinges on the intractability of discrete logarithm problem in the algebraic system. Historically, this problem has received considerable attention from leading mathematicians and cryptologists around the world [12] [13] [14] . Unlike the case of the discrete logarithm problem in finite fields, there is no subexponential-time algorithm known for the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP). The best algorithm known to data takes exponential time.
The security of the proposed MECDSA is based on the difficulty of solving the ECDLP, and is mainly faced with the following attacks. MECDSA security is presented by the following analysis of attacks:
(1) The attacker wishes to obtain private key 1 , 2 , … , using all information that is available from the scheme. In this case, the attacker can compute 1 , 2 , … according to the known public key 1 , 2 , … , , signature ( , 1 , 2 , … , ) and message m, and can further compute where = . If an attacker wanted to obtain the private key, he would need to solved = or = respectively for and , which is clearly infeasible because the difficulty of solving the ECDLP, where = 1,2, … , .
(2) The attacker wishes to obtain the private key 1 , 2 , … , 1 from a partial private key 1 , 2 , … , 2 , where 1 + 2 = . When the attacker can obtain 1 , 2 , … , 2 because of the backdoors in 2 ( 2 < t) elliptic curves, he needs to solved = or = respectively for and , which is clearly infeasible because the difficulty of solving the ECDLP, where = 1, 2, … , 1 .
Efficiency Analysis
The computational cost of the proposed MECDSA is mainly determined by addition and multiplication operation in the elliptic curve and inverse operation in the finite prime field. Assume that is the number of elliptic curves and ( ) is the length of the order of the base point . Table 1 gives the efficiency analysis of MECDSA and t-ECDSA, including the computational cost and signature length. 
Conclusion
In order to avoid backdoor in the ECDSA curve of cryptocurrency systems, the paper proposes a multiple elliptic curves digital signature algorithm (MECDSA), which allows the signer to not only choose the number of elliptic curves, but also specify the parameters of each elliptical curve. Our elliptic curves are not limited to the curve P-256 of national institute of standards and technology (NIST) 15 , SM2 of Chinese state cryptography administration 16 , secp256r111 and secp256k1 in standards for efficient cryptography, and others. We suggest that the systems based on blockchain should choose two elliptic curves considering the contradiction between security and efficiency.
